

## **Critical Perspective on Discourse in the Representation of Conflict in Ireland**

*Féilim Ó hAdhmaill, University College Cork*

### **Abstract**

This paper provides a critical analysis of the role of discourse in conflict situations, with a particular focus on dominant and competing discourses which have emerged in relation to conflict in Ireland historically. It begins with a general discussion about theoretical ideas around discourse, focusing in particular on the writings of critical theorists such as Gramsci, and Foucault. It engages with some of the key ideas about common-sense acceptance, reproduction and reinforcement of dominant hegemonic discourses, and how such hegemony emerges and is sustained. It also looks at how subordinate discourses often challenge and replace once dominant discourses. It then analyses how discourse plays a role in conflict in society and how discourse, like conflict itself, often changes in form and content depending on circumstance. Using examples of discourse, sourced from the print media and academic literature, about conflict in Ireland, the language and terminology used and how this has framed competing understandings and interpretations of the conflict, the article illustrates how conflict is reflected in competing discourses including dominant and subordinate variants. It argues that uncritical, unqualified acceptance of dominant discourse about conflict by academia and others potentially prevents the development of rigorous social scientific research, the unravelling of the underlying causes of conflict as well as potentially delaying the onset of real and meaningful peace building. It also potentially places academia firmly on the side of the status quo in conflict situations.

**Keywords:** *conflict; Ireland; competing discourses; representations; Northern Ireland*

## 1. Introduction

This paper aims to critically analyse the role of discourse, in reflecting, creating reproducing and reinforcing knowledge about conflict situations. It focuses, in particular on dominant and competing discourses which have emerged in relation to political conflict in Ireland, often linked to power as well as ideology. It aims to show that: i) different competing discourses exist, using different language and terminology to describe the same conflict and that ii) these discourses reflect different understandings and may include elements which are honest, or mistaken or sometimes deliberately misleading. There is often no one ‘absolute truth’ about a conflict situation, which all can agree upon. Indeed, an in-depth comprehension of each discourse is essential to develop a real understanding of conflict and promote peacebuilding. The paper argues that a rigorous social science needs to recognise that the unquestioning acceptance of dominant linguistic representations of conflict in the world may obscure complexities of the many conflicts which such representations often deny. In particular, the paper argues that uncritical, unqualified acceptance of the dominant discourse about conflict by academia potentially prevents the development of rigorous social scientific research, the unravelling of the underlying causes of conflict as well as potentially delaying the onset of real and meaningful peace building. It also potentially places academia firmly on the side of the status quo in conflict situations – “the rhetorical servant of the established order” (Gearty, 2002, p. 37).

The paper begins with a theoretical discussion around discourse, its role in knowledge creation, reproduction and reinforcement, and its inter-relationship with ideology and the role of power, focusing in particular, on the writings of critical theorists such as Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault. It engages with some of the key ideas about ‘common-sense’ acceptance, reproduction and reinforcement of dominant hegemonic discourses, and how such hegemony emerges and is sustained. The paper looks at how subordinate discourses often challenge and replace once dominant discourses. It also analyses how discourse plays a role in conflict in society and how discourse like conflict itself often changes in form and content depending on circumstance.

There then follows a discussion of dominant and competing discourses which have emerged in relation to conflict in Ireland. By using examples of discourse, sourced from the print media and academic literature, about conflict in Ireland, by considering language and terminology, and by discussing how this has framed competing understandings and interpretations of the

conflict, the paper illustrates how such different understandings of the conflict are reflected in competing discourses including dominant and subordinate variants.

## **2. Methodology and Theoretical Framework: Critical Perspectives on Discourse, Power, and Ideology in Society**

The methodology primarily involves a review of relevant academic literature but also includes the collection, processing and qualitative analysis of 525 newspaper reports pertaining to conflict in Ireland. The reports were collected from four newspapers – the Irish News, the Newsletter, the Belfast Telegraph and the Irish Times over the years 2016-2020 on a systematic basis, as part of a wider research project relating to the decade of centenary commemorations; many of the reports relate to different views on the historic conflict from the 1916-20 period. The first three newspapers are the main newspapers in the north, reflecting unionist and nationalist perspectives, while the Irish Times would be viewed as probably the most authoritative broadsheet in the south.

Discourse relates to the language used in conversation, writing, and thought. It frames our meanings and understandings of the world and thus constructs knowledge about the world (Hall, 1997). It refers to how we communicate, represent and think about people, groups, race, and religions as well as the economy, social institutions, social relationships, and society in general. It can influence, reinforce or change our behaviours and opinions. Indeed, according to Hall (1997):

The knowledge which a particular discourse produces connects with power, regulates conduct, makes up or constructs identities and subjectivities, and defines the way certain things are represented, thought about, practised and studied. (p. 6)

Discourse can operate in different ways at different levels and in different parts of the same society. Gee (2008) for example talks about different discourse communities, where the same people may talk and act in different ways to suit different social contexts and circumstances. Gee makes a distinction between discourse relating to the language used in social interactions and Discourse with a capital D which links with wider social practices, behaviour, values, ways of thinking, etc. He argues that “[l]anguage makes no sense outside of Discourses” (Gee, 2008, p. 3):

What it means is that what meanings we give to words is based on knowledge we acquire and choices we make, as well as values and beliefs—and, yes, even interests—we have. Words are consequential. They matter. Words and the world are married. (p 5)

For Critical Discourse Analysis theorists such as Fairclough (1992; 1995), Van Dijk (2006) and Wodak (2009), discourse cannot be adequately analysed in isolation from the realities of social context, structures of power, inequalities, and ideology in society. Indeed ideology, as a particular worldview, is often viewed as shaping discourse. It is through discourse that a particular ideology is organised and expressed in thought and language. This can operate at both a conscious or unconscious level reproducing and reinforcing particular ideological perspectives, assumptions, and value systems. While different competing discourses can exist in the same society, once a discourse becomes dominant throughout society, it, in turn, influences the reproduction and reinforcement of a particular ideology.

For Foucault, discourse is closely linked to both power and knowledge. It can provide legitimacy for certain kinds of ‘knowledge’ while undermining others. If linked to power it can create, reinforce and reproduce a particular worldview. Power is conveyed by discourse. Each society has social institutions, which act as custodians of knowledge and authority. Influenced by ideology, these shape the production of discourse and knowledge, and create ‘regimes of truth’:

Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth; that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned [...] the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. (Foucault, 1980, p. 131)

Looking at the transition in France from monarchy to liberal democracy as a result of the French Revolution, Foucault argued that it was an oversimplification to say that power had moved from monarch to the people. People could be controlled by the ability of those in government and in charge of institutions to create a framework of agreed rules and social norms. New, more humane practices of discipline and surveillance used in prisons, asylums, schools, and workhouses, linked to the growth in acceptance of ‘rational’ scientific ideas and new technologies, created compliant human beings who grew to internalise these accepted ‘norms’ of thinking and behaviour. Power did not just lie with the powerful elite in society, however, it

rested everywhere. People could resist. The battle over truth was over the 'accepted' norms and beliefs in a society, rather than an objective absolute truth (Foucault, 1980; 1975).

Foucault was writing primarily about specific institutions such as those related to punishment and imprisonment, deviance, sexuality, medicine, psychiatry and madness, but his work has informed ideas about discourse generally (Hall, 1997). When linked to power a discourse can promote, reinforce and reproduce one particular dominant view in society. Thus, having the power to create, promote and control a dominant discourse in a society may have a dramatic effect on how people think and act in that society. Dominant discourses are therefore of great interest to critical social scientists as they challenge/question what is taking place in a society.

Critical social science starts from a recognition of inequalities in power relationships in society, arguing that these are neither just nor sustainable. It attempts to unmask underlying structures and practices that can be obscured by the dominant ideology. To ignore them is to be complicit in reproducing and reinforcing them. As Harvey (1990) explains:

critical social research does not take the apparent social structure, social processes or accepted history for granted. It tries to dig beneath the surface of appearances. It asks how social systems really work, how ideology or history conceals the processes which oppress and control people [...]. In its engagement with oppressive structures it questions the nature of prevailing knowledge and directs attention at the processes and institutions which legitimate knowledge (Harvey, 1990, Criticism and Knowledge section, para 2).

For Marx, for example, the dominant discourse of a 'free market' was just a veil to conceal the true exploitative and oppressive nature of capitalist society. Capitalists controlled the institutions of society which in turn controlled most of the population, the workers. The police and army controlled through force, the Government through legislation, the Church, education system and the media through manipulation and propaganda. Marx argued that the Church, State, education system, the arts, and literature, all form a superstructure which promotes an ideology supporting the status quo, serving the interests of the real rulers of the world – the capitalists. Marx's role was to strip away the mask of this ideology, unveil the truth about the exploitation and challenge 'false consciousness' where workers fail to recognise their 'class' and 'class interests' (Marx & Engels, 1932/2001).

Gramsci (1971), in particular, questioned how powerful elites in society are able to convince the masses to 'willingly assent' to their ideology even when it does not appear to be in their

interests to do so. ‘Ideological hegemony’ allowed one class to dominate another through consent rather than force, although a combination of physical force or coercion with intellectual, moral and cultural inducement may be necessary. In this way, the ideological perspective of the powerful was understood to be ‘common sense’ by the masses. The Frankfurt School, led by Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and others, agreed with Gramsci. They discussed the factors which inhibit criticism and analysis of society, in particular pointing to the growth of ‘instrumental reason’ which is seen as the dominant way of thinking in capitalist societies. The search for the most efficient way to achieve ends generates an uncritical attitude towards the ends pursued. In *One Dimensional Man*, originally published in 1964, Marcuse argued that the mass of the population in advanced capitalist societies are manipulated, in the interests of capitalism, by political elites and the mass media. The latter obscure people’s true needs with the promotion of false needs associated with consumption, while technology, rather than helping to meet people’s true needs, is geared towards producing profitable consumer goods:

One-dimensional thought is systematically promoted by the makers of politics and their purveyors of mass information. Their universe of discourse is populated by self-validating hypotheses which, incessantly and monopolistically repeated, become hypnotic definitions or dictations. (Marcuse, 2002, p. 16)

The control of society through manipulation was of particular interest to Mills. In *The Sociological Imagination* (2000) he argued:

We cannot assume today that men must in the last resort be governed by their own consent. Among the means of power that now prevail is the power to manage and to manipulate the consent of men. That we do not know the limits of such power— and that we hope it does have limits—does not remove the fact that much power today is successfully employed without the sanction of the reason or the conscience of the obedient. (pp. 40-41)

In *Manufacturing Consent* Herman and Chomsky (1988), further argued that in western liberal democracies ‘consent’ is actually ‘manufactured’ to serve the interests of powerful elites in society and that the media play a vital role in creating this ‘consent’.

Of course, dominant discourses may also be contested by subordinate ones. In Foucault’s view for example, power resides everywhere, though that does not necessarily mean that everyone has equal access to power. In Freire’s (1970/2005) view, critical pedagogy – based on critical

thinking, questioning, ending subservience to ‘experts’ and establishing the democratisation of the education process – could change how we think, how we learn, how we view the world and how we act (to change it):

... every human being, no matter how "ignorant" or submerged in the "culture of silence" he or she may be, is capable of looking critically at the world in a dialogical encounter with others. (p. 32)

### **3. Discourse and Conflict**

During conflicts, discourse reflects how we think and communicate about the conflict, and the language, words, and assumptions used to represent people and events. It may include ideas, beliefs, assumptions, and shared values, as well as the terminology, words and phrases used to convey them. Each side’s perspective will be reflected in a discourse. Competing discourses reflect, reinforce and reproduce different understandings, meanings and ‘truths’ about the conflict, and influence which rationale for the conflict and which participants should be viewed as ‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’ in the eyes of the people and thus what or who should be supported. The discourse, if any, which becomes dominant in a conflict situation, and the role power plays in this is linked to wider questions such as what is the relationship between power and discourse in society and how are dominant discourses created and maintained?

A critical perspective on discourse in conflict situations argues that both the overt and hidden meanings and understandings transmitted in dominant discourse may promote one particular ideological perspective and understanding but cast a veil over others. Thus, to find out what is really happening in a conflict situation, the circumstances and the events, it is important to question the language being used, the words and the terminology.

Discourses can of course be relatively ‘honest’ and open, based on the perspective of the protagonist. However, they can also be deliberately misleading, aimed at hiding the ‘real’ reasons for the conflict. They can also be unintentionally misleading, based on false, incomplete, misinterpreted or misleading ‘knowledge’ and information. Dissenting voices can also challenge the ‘truths’ in any discourse. Each side therefore must struggle to ensure that its voice becomes dominant, among its own support base initially and then within wider society. That requires developing the necessary power, skills and tactics to promote one particular discourse and weaken another. For less powerful groups this presents a challenge. Lenin (1906) for example, argued that a strong united, disciplined vanguard was needed based on

‘democratic centralism’, freedom of discussion but unity of action. Alinsky, in his *Rules of Radicals* (1971) concentrated more on tactics; weaker groups can mobilise and by using the right tactics for the right situation, maintain and grow their own support base while weakening their stronger opponent. Sometimes reasoned argument and dialogue is sufficient; sometimes overt or covert means for winning ‘acceptance’ for one discourse is required. Powerful groups or governments can often influence discourse by overt coercive measures such as banning free speech, protest or expression and using the police or military to oppressively police any dissent. However, this may simply drive alternative voices underground, build up further resentment and lead to a resurgence of opposition in the future. Being able to gain supposedly ‘freely given’ acceptance for a particular discourse through manipulation and propaganda, may be more beneficial. The role of social institutions, the Church, the education system, censorship and the media are important as is the regulation of public space where physical and communicative interactions can take place.

Sometimes a subordinate discourse becomes dominant within a group, neighbourhood, or ‘side’ in the conflict, or in a state fighting against another state. It becomes the accepted ‘truth’ and over-rules minority discourses. The winners in a conflict usually create a dominant discourse justifying themselves and reproducing and reinforcing this justification, via the media, education, history, folklore, Church, state and social institutions. Sometimes this discourse is eventually accepted by the ‘losers’. For example, despite the continuing existence of the far right in parts of Germany, the dominant discourse about Nazi Germany is negative and quite similar to that of the rest of Europe. If the Nazis had won would that still be the case? What if no single discourse about a conflict becomes dominant, or there are no clear ‘winners’ or ‘losers’? What if minority discourses are maintained alongside dominant ones? In a ‘post-conflict’ society is it always possible to create a shared discourse? And if a shared discourse cannot be achieved, does this lead to continuing trauma, grievance and potential conflict in the future?

Discourse, by its nature, must change to reflect both changing circumstances in society and changing events within a conflict. Like the conflict itself it evolves. The initial ‘causes’ of the conflict may be replaced. Events/issues resulting from the conflict itself, may feed and sustain it, as the original issues become forgotten or resolved or irrelevant and enthusiasm wanes; or it is replaced by a new enthusiasm for something else. The politics of the last atrocity may also reign. For example, in the north of Ireland dissatisfaction with Partition, British-rule and discrimination, became articulated by nationalists in mid 1960s as demands for reform and



equal citizenship within the UK. This was reflected in the demise of the old constitutional Nationalist Party and its replacement by what was to become in 1970 the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). For others though, the discourse of civil rights was quickly replaced in the turmoil of the rioting, intimidation and killings of 1969, by the alternative discourse of 'resistance' and then 'rebellion'. The dominant government discourse altered little. Northern Ireland was under attack by first civil rights and now the IRA.

Often conflict and its causes can be very complex. There may be a range of causes: personal, interpersonal, community-based, or ideal-based. Causes may be rational, based on interests, values, or beliefs. They may be based on past events, current concerns or worries about the future. They may be based on particular understandings of reality, misunderstandings, misinterpretation, lack of knowledge or information or misleading information. They invariably involve emotions. Indeed, there can be a range of interlocking causes. These may or may not be reflected in discourse about the conflict; discourse is often deliberately or unintentionally misleading about both the causes and the opponents. The presenting issue may not be the real underlying issue or issues. Indeed, there may be complex layers of factors some of which remain hidden.

It is important to note that conflict can take different forms in society. It does not have to be violent. Indeed, most critical perspectives will argue that not only is conflict natural in society, it is needed to progress society, to challenge and to develop new ideas or new ways of organising or running society. It is the destructive forms of conflict which need to be addressed rather than conflict itself. 'Conflict transformation' is sometimes posited as a solution to destructive conflicts rather than necessarily 'conflict resolution' (Lederach, 1995). Thus conflict is transformed from a destructive to a less destructive form by transforming the context in which it operates. An example might be the transformation from civil war in Ireland (1922-23) to the conflict that takes place in Leinster House (the Irish Parliament). Discourse about conflict thus can include justifications or denunciations of violence or the promotion of non-violent, constitutional, democratic, peaceful means.

#### **4. Discourse and Conflict in Ireland**

The current 'decade of centenaries' relating to the 1912-23 period of conflict in Ireland, and how to commemorate them (if at all) poses many questions for academics and politicians alike. Periods of violent conflict have peppered Ireland's past for at least 800 years. In large part these

have invariably been associated with Ireland's historical relationship with Britain, the legacy of this, and of the resultant challenges to the legitimacy of authority and institutions. Competing discourses about such conflict have been influenced by different political and ideological perspectives on the islands of Ireland, Britain and elsewhere, and are reflected in conflicting language and terminology used to convey understandings, interpretations and meanings. With continuing political and ideological division on the island about both the causes of the conflict and the solution, these competing discourses continue to challenge attempts to not just remember the past but to agree on the future. The legacy of the 1912-23 period was not a lasting peace agreement and national reconciliation, but a continuing conflict, violent and non-violent, throughout much of the 20<sup>th</sup> century culminating in the 'Troubles' in the north from 1969-97, the 'legacy' of which further feeds the competing discourses.

These competing discourses are reflected in terminology and symbolism, in speech, song, monuments, flags, and murals, used to remember events and describe the different sides (Bryan & Gillespie, 2005). They are also reflected in academia. Even the use of terminology such as 'colonialism' is contested, with some historians arguing that Ireland was part of the UK from 1801 and not a colony during either the campaign for Home Rule/Independence or during the recent conflict, 1969-97, in the north (Miller, 1998). While the dominant discourse in the south of Ireland terms the events of 1919-21, as the 'War of Independence' (Crowley et al., 2017), others refer to IRA actions then as 'murder'. In the north those events are invariably referred to as 'the Troubles' (as is the 1969-97 period). Most unionists echo the words of Arlene Foster, the Northern Ireland First Minister and Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) Leader, in viewing, both periods of conflict as 'terrorism' and 'an attack on British democracy' (Arlene Foster: Why I did not go to the Dublin centenary event, 2016). Such views have not changed much in the past 100 years. In 1920, unionist discourse, similar to the UK government discourse (Walker, 2020), termed the IRA as 'murder gangs' attempting to 'terrorise' the population into an Irish republic. For example, in the debate on the Government of Ireland Bill, in Westminster in May 1920, Colonel Walter Guinness, a southern Ireland Conservative MP talked about the fear of 'terrorism' felt by Irish unionists at the prospect of Home Rule (Phoenix, 1920/2020, May).

Of course, the activities of the RIC (and the Black and Tans)<sup>1</sup> along with the UVF, a unionist militia created in Ulster in 1913 to oppose Irish nationalism (Bowman, 2017), were likewise

---

<sup>1</sup> The RIC (Royal Irish Constabulary) was an armed paramilitary organisation established by the UK Government in the 19<sup>th</sup> century to recruit Irish people to police Ireland and operated until 1922. The Black and Tans were an

branded as ‘terrorism’ by mainstream nationalist opinion at that time as illustrated in media reports of UVF attacks on nationalist areas of Derry City in June 1920 (Phoenix, 1920/2020, June). Nationalists on the streets of Belfast, also termed RIC assassinations the work of “the Murder Gang” (Baker, 2003, p. 53; Glennon, 2020).

Most northern nationalists, while probably supportive of the IRA who fought in the 1919-21 period, would also be unlikely to describe the events as the ‘War of Independence’. The ‘War’ did not bring ‘independence’ for them, so the term has had little meaning for them. They also lived in a society where the dominant discourse has been that the IRA of that period and throughout the 20th century were ‘terrorists’ and where expressing support for any form of republicanism, at least until the late 1990s, was very dangerous. The IRA was illegal, and support for it or its political wing could lead to arrest/harassment at the hands of the police/British Army and potential targets for loyalist militias (Cadwallader, 2013).

The more recent violent conflict (1969-97) was mainly confined to the north of the country, with no clearly defined ‘winners’ or ‘losers’ and a peace settlement’ in 1998 which has been described as more related to ‘conflict transformation’ than ‘conflict resolution’ (Shirlow et al., 2005). It is also represented differently in the competing discourses (and there are more than two), reflecting different understandings and interpretations. The often-bitter debates around the causes and ‘legacy’ of that conflict and indeed the merits or otherwise of the ‘peace process’ itself reflect these differences (Dixon, 2018).

In the north, Sinn Féin, the main nationalist party present a discourse of a risen people continuing the struggle of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, opposing British colonial rule and military occupation. For example, Sinn Féin leader, Mary Lou McDonald stated in May 2020 that “the IRA’s campaign was justified” (Hughes, 2020). The main unionist party, the DUP, like the other Unionist parties, views the conflict as having been a terrorist conspiracy aimed at destroying Northern Ireland as an entity and attacking democracy. In November 2017 for example, the DUP leader Arlene Foster responded to a Sinn Féin MP describing the deceased leader, Martin McGuinness as a “‘proud member of the IRA’ at the party’s Ard Fheis by condemning Sinn Féin’s ‘glorification [...] of the IRA and terrorism’” (Arlene Foster condemns Sinn Féin ‘glorification of terrorism’. 2017).

---

auxiliary police force recruited mainly among ex-British soldiers to supplement the RIC in its battle against the IRA from 1920-22.

The discourse of the northern pro-nationalist but anti-IRA Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) views both the unionists and the IRA as having been wrong, the former for rejecting reform or power sharing and the latter for engaging in violence. According to the SDLP the correct approach to change was via peaceful, constitutional means. It has also consistently argued for more Irish government involvement in the north and the importance of building relations throughout the island and between Ireland and Britain (The IRA set united Ireland back years: SDLP leader. 2005).

The dominant discourse in the south has generally been negative to republicans in particular, who were viewed as trying to usurp the authority of the Irish government, while unionists were often viewed as intolerant (Hanley, 2018). However, the overarching element was a desire to keep the ‘Troubles’ in the north and out of the south. Official government censorship laws relating to the broadcast media, self-censorship in most of the Irish press and a general antagonism among newspaper owners towards republicans during that conflict reinforced and reproduced this dominant discourse (Corcoran & O’ Brien, 2005).

Whilst a small number of Catholic priests may have been viewed as sympathetic to the republicans, the Catholic Church hierarchy was for the most part hostile to both the IRA and Sinn Féin during this period. Throughout the 1970s, 80s and 90s the Bishops issued regular scathing condemnations of both IRA activity in the North and of Sinn Féin (Ó hAdhmaill, 2013).<sup>2</sup>

Competing discourses have also been reflected in the terminology used in naming the two separate jurisdictions created by partition. For example, when the then Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister), Leo Varadkar, in May 2020 chastised Sinn Féin for referring to the Irish state as the ‘South of Ireland’, ‘Free State’ or ‘the Southern State’ (in response to criticism (Ainsworth, 2020) that he had referred to Belfast as being ‘overseas’), he was illustrating to all, the political nuances of language and indeed its power to create and reproduce particular meanings/representations in conflict situations.

Since ‘Éire’ or ‘Ireland’ (in English) has been the official name of the Irish state since 1937 it is understandable that the then head of the Government might regard the use of any other name

---

<sup>2</sup> See for example: the press statement by Bishop Cathal Daly, Bishop of Down and Connor (*Irish News*, 1984, January 3); the statements from Bishop Daly of Derry attacking the IRA (*Irish News*, 1984, October 20, p. 1; 1986, September 1, p. 1); Bishop Cathal Daly attacking both the IRA and Sinn Fein (*Irish News*, 1984, January 3, p. 7; 1985, March 15); Bishop Cathal Daly blaming the loyalist sectarian murder of a Catholic on IRA provocation (*Irish News*, 1988, August 12, p. 1; 1987, September 24, p. 1; 1986, March 19, p.1); the statement from Bishop Cathal Daly attacking Sinn Fein (*Irish News*, 1986, January 2, p.1).

as insulting. However, this is where the complexities of discourse begin to unfold, because the ‘argument’ over terminology reflects different discourses of both the past and the present and their legitimacy.

When Ireland was partitioned in 1921, after a long, bitter, and divisive campaign for independence, the new entity south of the border was called the Irish Free State and continued to have ties to the UK state. The 1921 ‘agreement’ itself led to conflict, north and south of the border, with some republicans viewing the ‘Free State’ as something less than the republic that had been proclaimed in the 1916 rebellion (Ó hAdhmaill, 2019). They used the term ‘Free State’ as a derisory term while much of the population north and south used it simply as the official title. The current official name of the Irish state was set out in De Valera’s 1937 *Bunreacht na hÉireann* (Irish Constitution) which changed the name to ‘Éire’, or ‘Ireland’ in English. Though a republic was legislated for and agreed with the UK by 1949, that name did not change (Daly, 2007). However, the name ‘Ireland’ referred to the whole of the island, north and south, in articles 2 and 3 of that Constitution, much to the annoyance of unionists north of the border who found this a threat and an insult to their own political entity – Northern Ireland (NI). It also placed a political imperative on successful Irish governments to promote ‘reintegration of the national territory’ although outside of rhetoric at election time little was done by any government in that regard.

It was not until the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, signed after nearly 30 years of further violent conflict (1969-97), that *Bunreacht na hÉireann* was changed to remove the claim that ‘the national territory’ included ‘Northern Ireland’ and replace it with an aspiration for Irish unity instead. The Agreement also recognised anyone associated with the island of Ireland, north and south, as having equal entitlement to Irish citizenship. What is ‘Ireland’ therefore has been interpreted in different ways at different periods in Irish history and, even today, may reflect an ideological position, conscious or unconscious.

Similar issues exist in relation to terminology used to describe Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland became the official name of the new entity composed of Ireland’s six north-eastern counties and created by the Government of Ireland Act 1920. The Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921, led to the legal acceptance of partition by the new Free State Government, even though its Minister of Defence and IRA leader, Michael Collins, continued to arm and finance the IRA in the north and encourage them to continue to destabilize the new regime there into 1922. Indeed, nationalist teachers in the north, rejecting the legitimacy of Northern Ireland continued to get paid their salaries by the new Free State Government up until the end of 1922. Most Irish

nationalists including successive Irish governments rejected the legitimacy of the northern entity, officially termed ‘Northern Ireland’, with its own parliament but remaining as a region within the UK state. Most refused to recognise that legitimacy by calling it not by its official title, but instead by using terms like ‘the Six Counties’ or ‘the North’. Long-time Taoiseach and then President, Eamonn De Valera consistently referred to the north as the ‘Occupied Six Counties’. The then Taoiseach, Jack Lynch referred to it as ‘the Six Counties’ in a speech outlining Irish Government policy in September 1969 (Lynch, 1969). Later, another Taoiseach, Charlie Haughey was to term it a ‘failed political entity’ at the Fianna Fáil Ard Fheis in 1980 and in subsequent years (NI a failed political entity, says Haughey. 1986). Despite the Belfast Agreement, many nationalists in the north still refer to ‘north’ and ‘south’ when referring to both parts of the island of Ireland.

Discourses in conflicts often make analogies with revered events, actions, people of the past, based on ‘truth’ (for us) but influenced by myth, perspective, etc. They link ‘us’ with past ‘heroes’ or past ‘heroic actions’ or with what is culturally revered in ‘our’ society today – including religion. In societies where religion is important then it has often been historically important to link ‘our fight’ to religion, to justify and sustain it (e.g., Crusade, Jihad, use of padres in armies). Past ‘heroic feats’ become part of folklore, song history, and the group’s discourse about its past and present. They help to explain who the group is in the present as well as what it did in the past. They also help explain who the enemy is or was. National anthems, songs of resistance, and national or group commemorations also link these discourses to emotions reinforcing and reproducing them. It is maybe of interest to note that the unofficial and apparently more popular ‘national anthem’ of Ireland, sung by supporters at sporting events, is not *Amhrán na BhFiann* (the official Irish national anthem in the Irish language) but *The Fields of Athenry*. This is a song about a man imprisoned for stealing corn during the Famine/Great Hunger in the 1840s and waiting to be shipped off to prison in Van Diemen’s Land. This may suggest a disconnect between the official state discourse and the rest of the population, raising questions about whether Irish people are more comfortable associating with loss and suffering than with making heroic stands on the battlefield! It may be a sign of continuing psychological trauma based on continuing political and ideological divisions on the island? On the other hand it may simply be that many Irish people (not being fluent in the language) may feel uncomfortable singing in Irish.

Rebel songs tend to link republicans to (a usually failed) heroic struggle, accompanied by prison and death (e.g. *Kevin Barry, Boolavogue*). Whilst the nationalists gained a state in 1921,

they lost a lot in the process; the deaths, the divisions of the Civil War, the loss of the north. The 32 County republic proclaimed in 1916 had not been achieved and the new state for most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was unable to provide for its people, in the way that other European states had, with welfare states and full employment. It was not until the mid-1990s that a new wave of optimism began to enthuse the state, with the Celtic Tiger<sup>3</sup> and Jackie's Army<sup>4</sup> (Ó hAdhmaill, 2016). It was also during this time that the peace process began to develop in the north.

Indeed, some of the more militant republican songs seem to cause embarrassment and lead to condemnations in the media, as when a newly elected Sinn Féin TD joined the exuberant entourage in a rendition of 'Come out ye Black and Tans' in February 2020 (Hutton & Horgan-Jones, 2020). Ironically, the same song reached no 1 in the Irish and UK charts and no 5 in the Australian charts, in January 2020, in an apparent protest against a proposal by an Irish government minister to officially commemorate the RIC as part of the Decade of Commemorations (Mangan 2020). That in itself is an example of some of the unresolved legacies of conflict on the island. Whilst all songs of resistance promote a particular discourse and challenge that of opponents some are much more overt than others. *Róisín Dubh* (my dark Roseleen) for example, was a patriotic song written in the 16<sup>th</sup> century in which references to Ireland are disguised as references to a woman who is loved. At the time, it would have been dangerous to be more overt. On the other hand, the republican song, *The Ballad of Joe McDonnell*, after one of the 1981 IRA Hunger Strikers in the north, directly challenges the dominant discourse about IRA 'terrorism':

And you dare to call me a terrorist  
 While you look down your gun  
 When I think of all the deeds that you have done  
 You have plundered many nations, divided many lands  
 You have terrorized their peoples  
 You ruled with an iron hand  
 And you brought this reign of terror to my land

---

<sup>3</sup> The Celtic Tiger refers to the unprecedented period of economic growth and employment in the Irish state from 1995-2000.

<sup>4</sup> Jackie's Army refers to the Ireland's national soccer team supporters who experienced along with the nation a period of unprecedented success for their team while Jack Charlton was manager 1986-1996.

Orange<sup>5</sup> songs usually in direct contrast to republican songs tend to depict a heroic besieged minority, holding out against overwhelming odds to be victorious in the end (e.g. *The Sash, Derry's Walls, Dolly's Brae*) (Radford, 2004). A notion of superiority and indeed machoism appears in many of the songs. The Billy Boys is one particularly blood-curdling song, which includes the line “We’re up to our knees in Fenian (Catholic) blood, Surrender or you’ll die”. Originally written in Glasgow for one of the sectarian gangs there (Davies, 2006) it is still played regularly at Orange demonstrations in the north and indeed sung at football matches (*BBC Sport*, 2014, April 16).

Concepts of national identity as reflected in different discourses have also been affected by the conflict in Ireland. Up until partition most unionists had viewed themselves as ‘Irish’ (as well as British). At one Orange demonstration in 1920, one prominent unionist stated that they were all Irishmen, but they were also British and Britons and would never be slaves (Phoenix, 1920/2020, July). At the 1892 Ulster Unionist Convention in Belfast, a banner proudly declared in Irish “Erin Go Bragh” (Ireland Forever) while Robert Shipboy McAdam, a unionist, was to the fore in the Irish language revival in Belfast in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century (and his name now adorns the Belfast MacAdaim Ó Fiaich Cultúrlann in the republican Falls Road area). Ireland’s Heritage Orange Lodge (Oidhreacht na hÉireann) in the north, had an Irish Language name, and banner with which it marched, at least up until the early 1970s (Ó Snodaigh, 1973; Pritchard, 2004; Phoenix, 1970/2020). However, as the new NI attempted to create its own distinct identity, separate from that in ‘the south’, identity and language along with commemorations, flags, statues, the teaching of history, and control of public space, all became important. As the new government in the south attempted to promote the Irish language as a national language, the NI government discouraged it (Andrews, 1997). Between 1924 and 1927 the number of primary schools teaching Irish was halved and the numbers studying Irish as an extra subject fell considerably. The subsidy for Irish as an extra subject was abolished in 1934 (Mac Póilin, 2006). Since then, the Irish language has been offered as an optional subject only in some (mainly Catholic) schools. Public signs in Irish were effectively banned under law by the 1949 Local Govt Act, which stated that only English could be used. The ban was lifted by the British Government in the early 1990s. Irish was banned in the legal system and in

---

<sup>5</sup> The Orange Order was established in 1795 to unite Protestants in Ireland behind loyalty to the British Crown and defence against the majority Catholic population. The 12<sup>th</sup> July Orange Day marches commemorating the victory of the Protestant King William over the Catholic King James in 1690, accompanied by songs reinforce and reproduce a discourse of a victorious besieged community battling against the Catholic population trying to defeat it.



Parliament and there was no programming in Irish until radio programmes were introduced in the 1980s. The dominant discourse was that NI was British and English speaking, despite a minority discourse which rejected this. There was no official recognition of the language as being associated in any way with the north. The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement changed the discourse in relation to Irishness and the Irish language to some extent. An Irish identity was legitimised as equally valid to a British one. Funding was made available to promote Irish language education, community projects and TV programmes, though an Irish Language Act has yet to be passed. While some unionists particularly associated with the DUP continue to view the language with hostility, sometimes making insulting comments about it ('Curry my yogurt': DUP's Gregory Campbell criticised for 'ignorant' Irish language comments, 2014), others such as Linda Ervine and the Turas project in East Belfast have embraced it (Mitchell & Miller, 2019).

Conflicting discourses also exist in relation to place names in the north (although the vast majority remain as anglicised forms of their original Irish names). For example, the official name of the city Londonderry has long been rejected by nationalists and most people south of the border, as a celebration of colonialism and dispossession. It rarely appears on official maps in 'the south' (on road signage 'Derry'<sup>6</sup> is used) or in broadcasts by the national media network RTE. Yet unionists embrace it as a reflection of their plantation city, their heritage. In 1984, after pressure from the nationalist controlled City Council the British Direct Rule administration at the time changed the Council's name to Derry City Council much to the annoyance of unionists throughout Northern Ireland. However, the official name for the city, Londonderry, remains (Statutory Rules of N. I., 1984). The parliamentary constituency was re-named Foyle (after the river running through it) as was the regional BBC station to avoid controversy and BBC journalists were instructed to use both names in broadcasts in equal measure. Interestingly the adjoining unionist majority constituency is called East Londonderry, though the nationalist political parties and the regional nationalist newspaper, *The Irish News*, refer to it as 'East Derry'. Ironically the city is referred to as 'Derry' by its inhabitants and a number of predominantly unionist organisations in the city use the term. For example, 'Derry' not 'Londonderry' is used in the name of the unionist organisation, 'The Apprentice Boys of

---

<sup>6</sup> Derry is the anglicised form of the original Irish name Doire Cholmcille - St Colmcille's settlement, 'place of the oak trees'.

Derry’, which organises marches each year to commemorate the lifting of the siege of the Protestant plantation town of Derry, by the Catholic King James I in 1689<sup>7</sup>.

Despite demographic and political changes in the north of Ireland in recent years, which along with Brexit suggest a growing number in favour of Irish reunification, the people remain deeply divided in terms of identity, politics and attitudes to Irish re-unification. In the south the overt dominant discourse appears to be in favour of re-unification (reflected in *Bunreacht na hEireann* and in opinion polls). However, the obstacles to achieving this seem insurmountable (and not worth the trouble). When in July 2020 the new Taoiseach, Micheál Martin, castigated those calling for a border poll (contingencies for which are included in the Belfast Agreement) as being ‘unnecessarily divisive’, he was probably reflecting some of that sentiment. Of course, the border itself, as well as reflecting divisions on the island has also reinforced and reproduced division. For most of its existence there has been limited co-operation or dialogue between the two administrations, north and south, and it was not until the 1960s that a Taoiseach officially visited the Northern Ireland entity for the first time.

While the Belfast Agreement and the end of the Troubles led to the removal of British Army checkpoints, and the creation of what is almost an invisible physical border, despite the promise, the development of cross border bodies and initiatives have been limited. Meanwhile within the north, while there has been some mixing of nationalists and unionists, particularly in middle class areas, segregated communal living remains a feature in both rural and urban areas, often reflecting demographic patterns laid down during the time of the plantations in the early 17th century. Indeed, the number of so-called peace walls has increased to around 116 since the end of the armed conflict (Belfast Interface Project, 2017).

However, there are some signs of changing discourses. In the past successive Unionist governments branded ‘Catholics’ as a threat to Northern Ireland who should be denied jobs (Farrell, 1976). In a clumsy attempt to win support from fellow Unionists for civil rights reforms in 1969, the then Unionist Prime Minister, Terence O’Neill echoed this discourse:

It is frightfully hard to explain to Protestants that if you give Roman Catholics a good job and a good house they will live like Protestants because they will see neighbours with cars and television sets; they will refuse to have eighteen children. But if a Roman Catholic is jobless, and lives in the most ghastly hovel, he will rear eighteen children

---

<sup>7</sup> For more information on this organisation see the website <https://apprenticeboysofderry.org/>.

on National Assistance. If you treat Roman Catholics with due consider and kindness, they will live like Protestants in spite of the authoritative nature of their Church. (Interview with Terence O'Neill, 1969).

Whilst religious sectarianism remains a problem, it is now rarely mentioned in overt political discourse by political parties, a sign perhaps of the impact of strong equality legislation in the north since 1989 (Russell, 2012).

In 2019, the EU Parliamentary and the Stormont Assembly elections witnessed major swings to the Alliance Party which has an open mind on the border and whilst both Sinn Fein and DUP remain the biggest parties there is no longer a political unionist overall majority (nor an overall nationalist one), McClements (2019). Whilst disagreement over Brexit and the NI Protocol (agreed between the UK and the EU) have, along with demographic changes, raised tensions and led to some uncertainty about the future, Sinn Féin and the DUP share the First Minister role in the NI Executive established by the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 1998, and the notion of power-sharing with republicans, which had long been rejected by the majority of unionists, is now in operation between five parties, with little opposition (Hayward, 2020). Growing diversity and secularism north and south are reflected in the discourse of politicians and in the political process. Indeed power-sharing between old enemies in the north is now reflected in the south, where the two civil war parties which dominated politics as bitter opponents are now in Government together (Bray, 2020). Whilst conflicting and changing political discourses about the past, present and possible future remain north and south in Ireland, it seems clear that there is no longer one (or even two) dominant political discourse(s), either north or south.

One question not pursued by this paper and which may form the basis of future research might include how best to apply knowledge about competing discourses in conflict situations to promote peace building. Whilst constructive conflicts may be necessary to promote one's version of progress and different ideas about how to organise the world are part of the human essence, it is also clear that some conflicting discourses can be challenged by social scientists where they are based on false, incomplete, misinterpreted or misleading 'knowledge' and information. However, how to do that without exacerbating a conflict situation is an acquired skill in itself. Another question not covered in this paper relates to what factors influence changes in competing discourses – social, economic, political and cultural, and to what extent such factors as increased global migration, international travel, social media information

exchange, changing life expectations, equality, human rights, diversity protection legislation, and social policy can impact on competing discourses and in which ways.

## References

- Ainsworth, P. (2020, May 11). Taoiseach: I'm sincerely sorry for referring to north as 'overseas'. *The Irish News*, 1.
- Alinsky, S. (1971). *Rules for radicals*. Vintage Books.
- Andrews, L. (1997). The very dogs in Belfast will bark in Irish: The Unionist government and the Irish language, 1921-43. In A. Mac Póilin (Ed.), *The Irish Language in Northern Ireland* (pp. 49-94). Ultach Trust.
- Arlene Foster condemns Sinn Féin 'glorification of terrorism'. (2017, November 21). *The Irish Times*.
- Arlene Foster: Why I did not go to the Dublin centenary event. (2016, April 2). *Newsletter*.
- Baker, J. (2003). *The Mahon family murders*. Glenravel Local History Project.  
<https://issuu.com/glenravel/docs/mcmmurders>.
- Belfast Interface Project. (2017). *Interface barriers, peacelines and defensive architecture*. BIP.
- Bowman, T. (2017). Ulster will fight. In J. Crowley, D. Ó Drisceoil, & M. Murphy (Eds.), *Atlas of the Irish revolution* (pp. 151- 158). Cork University Press.
- Bray, J. (2020, April 14). Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil reach agreement on historic framework for government. *The Irish Times*.
- Bryan, D., & Gillespie, G. (2005). *Transforming conflict: Flags and emblems*. Institute of Irish Studies, Queen's University Belfast.
- Cadwallader, A. (2013). *Lethal allies: British collusion in Ireland*. Mercier Press.
- Corcoran, M., & O'Brien, M. (2005). *Political censorship and the democratic State: The Irish broadcasting ban*. Four Courts Press.
- Crowley, J., Ó Drisceoil, D., & Murphy, M. (Eds.). (2017). *Atlas of the Irish revolution*. Cork University Press.
- 'Curry my yogurt': DUP's Gregory Campbell criticised for 'ignorant' Irish language comments. (2014, November 3). *Belfast Telegraph*.  
<https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/curry-my-yogurt-dups-gregory-campbell-criticised-for-ignorant-irish-language-comments-30714202.html>

- Daly, M. (2007). The Irish Free State/Éire/Republic of Ireland/Ireland: A country by any other name? *Journal of British Studies*, 46(1), 72-90.
- Davies, A. (2006). Football and sectarianism in Glasgow during the 1920s and 1930s. *Irish Historical Studies*, 35(138), 200-219.
- Dixon, P. (2018, March 28). The truth about the Good Friday Agreement is that, if it wasn't for deliberate deceptions, there would be no peace process here. *Belfast Telegraph*.
- Fairclough, N. (1992). *Language and power*. Longman.
- Fairclough, N. (1995). *Critical discourse analysis: The critical study of language*. Longman.
- Farrell, M. (1976). *Northern Ireland: The orange State*. Pluto Press.
- Foucault, M. (1975). *Discipline and punishment: The birth of the prison*. Vintage Books/Random House.
- Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977*. Harvester.
- Freire, P. (2005). *Pedagogy of the oppressed*. New York: Continuum. (Original work published 1970)
- Gearty, C. (2002). Terrorism and morality. *RUSI Journal*, 147 (5), 34– 39.
- Gee, J. P. (2008). *Social linguistics and literacies: Ideology in discourses* (5th ed.). Routledge.
- Glennon, K. (2020). *From pogrom to civil war: Tom Glennon and the Belfast IRA*. Mercier Press.
- Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the prison notebooks*. International Publishers.
- Hall, S. (1997). The work of representation. In S. Hall (Ed.), *Representation: Cultural representations and signifying practices* (pp.13-74). Sage Publications.
- Hanley, B. (2018). *The impact of the Troubles on the Republic of Ireland, 1968–79*. Manchester University Press.
- Hayward, K. (2020). The 2019 general election in Northern Ireland: The rise of the centre ground? *The Political Quarterly*, 91(1), 49-55.
- Harvey, L. (1990). *Critical social research*. London: Unwin Hyman.
- Herman, E. S., & Chomsky, N. (1988). *Manufacturing consent: The political economy of the mass media*. Pantheon Books.
- Hughes, B. (2020, May 25). IRA campaign was justified says Sinn Féin leader Mary Lou McDonald. *The Irish News*, 1.
- Hutton, B., & Horgan-Jones, J. (2020, February 9). Sinn Féin's Dessie Ellis dismisses criticism of joining rebel sing-song. *The Irish Times*.

- Interview with Terence O'Neill. (1969, May 10). *Belfast Telegraph*.  
<https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/ton10569.htm>
- The IRA set united Ireland back years: SDLP leader. (2005, November 12). *The Irish News*.
- Irish FA bans 'Billy Boys' song for Linfield fans. (2014, April 16). BBC Sport.  
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/27054281>
- McClements, F. (2019, December 13). Alliance's success reveals how Northern politics has changed. *The Irish Times*.
- Lederach, J.P. (1995). *Preparing for peace: Conflict transformation across cultures*. Syracuse University Press.
- Lenin, V.I. (1906). Freedom to criticise and unity of action. Volna, 22. In *Lenin collected works* (1965), 10 (pp. 442-443). Progress Publishers.  
<https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1906/may/20c.htm>
- Lynch, J. (1969). *The situation in the six counties of the North-East Ireland*. Irish Government. <https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/docs/lynch/lynch69.htm>
- Mangan, I. (2020, January 13). 'Come out ye black and tans' reaches Top 5 in Australian music charts after soaring to Number 1 in Ireland and the UK. *Irish Mirror*.
- McConville, M. L. (2020, July 13). Micheál Martin rules out 'unnecessarily divisive' border poll. *The Irish News*, 1.
- Mac Póilin, A. (2010). Something of a cultural war: Linguistic politics in Northern Ireland. *Language Issues*, 15-32.
- Marcuse, H. (2002). *One dimensional man: Studies in the ideology of advanced industrial society* (2nd ed.). Routledge.
- Marx, K., & Engels, F. (2001). *The German ideology part one, with selections from parts two and three, together with Marx's introduction to a critique of political economy*. International Publishers. (Original publication 1932)
- Miller, D. (1998). Colonialism and academic representations of the Troubles. In D. Miller (Ed.), *Rethinking Northern Ireland: Culture, ideology and colonialism* (pp. 3-39). Longman.
- Mills, C. W. (2000). *The sociological imagination*. Oxford University Press.
- Mitchell, D., & Miller, M. (2019). Reconciliation through language learning? A Case study of the Turas Irish Language Project in East Belfast. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 42(2), 235-253.
- NI a failed political entity, says Haughey. (1986, October 13). *The Irish Times*.

- Ó hAdhmaill, F. (2016). Ireland and the global economic crisis: One island, two different experiences. In M. Murphy & F. Dukelow (Eds.), *The Irish welfare state in the twenty-first century: Challenges and change* (pp. 287-308). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ó hAdhmaill, F. (2019). The Easter rising (1916) in Ireland and its historical context: The campaign for an Irish democracy. In I. Ness & Z. Cope (Eds.), *The Palgrave encyclopaedia of imperialism and anti-imperialism*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ó hAdhmaill, F. (2013). The Catholic church and revolution in Ireland. *Socialist History*, (43),1-25.
- Ó Snodaigh, P. (1973). *Hidden Ulster: The other Hidden Ireland*. Clódhanna Teo.
- Phoenix, E. (2020, January 27). On this day. *The Irish News*, 19. (Originally published 1920, January 27)
- Phoenix, E. (2020, May 19). On this day. *The Irish News*, 19. (Originally published 1920, May 19)
- Phoenix, E. (2020, June 22). On this day. *The Irish News*, 19. (Originally published 1920, June 22)
- Phoenix, E. (2020, July 16). On this day. *The Irish News*, 23. (Originally published 1920, July 16)
- Phoenix, E. (2020, August 7). On this day. *The Irish News*, 17. (Originally published 1970, August)
- Pritchard, R. (2004). Protestants and the Irish language: Historical heritage and current attitudes in Northern Ireland. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, 25(1), 62-82.
- Radford, K. (2004). Red, white, blue and orange: An exploration of historically bound allegiances through loyalist song. *The World of Music*, 46(1), 71-89.
- Russell, R. (2012). *Fair Employment in Northern Ireland: The decades of change (1990 – 2010)*. 121/12. Northern Ireland Assembly, Research and Information Service.
- Shirlow, P., Graham, B., Ó hAdhmaill, F., McEvoy, K., & Purvis, D. (2005). *Politically motivated former prisoner groups: Community activism and conflict transformation*. Northern Ireland Community Relations Council.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (2006). Ideology and discourse analysis. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 11(2), 115-140.
- Walker, B. M. (2020, June 9). Voices opposing violence in 1920. *The Irish Times*.

Wodak, R. (2009). Critical discourse analysis: History, agenda, theory and methodology. In R. Wodak, & M. Meyer (Eds.), *Methods of critical discourse analysis* (2nd ed.) (pp. 1-33). Sage.